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Brokerage, a term prominent in the 1960s and 1970s, has returned. A huge litera-
ture analyses how brokers and intermediators— such as government officials, heads of 
non- governmental organization (NGOs), translators, neo- traditional authorities— 
strategically negotiate flows of resources and political support between the local, 
national, and/ or international level. The phenomenon seems especially prominent in 
areas of limited statehood (ALS). Governments may be unwilling or unable to exercise 
authority throughout their territory. Thus, other mediators step in.
Several contentious debates have ensued around this. One debate concerns the scope 
and historical origins of brokerage, often portraying brokers as a thing of the past and a 
pathology of the non- Western world. Such perspectives, however, do not consider the 
crucial role and long- term effects of colonialism and closely related distinct trajecto-
ries of state formation, for understanding brokerage as a key mode of governance in 
ALS, past and present (see also Chapter 12 Förster/ Koechlin, this volume). Indirect gov-
ernance via brokerage and intermediation has, in addition, become a widespread phe-
nomenon in many parts of the world including Europe and North America. The liberal 
(global) governance agenda of the last decades, by promoting community governance, 
empowered ‘new’ brokers, such as NGOs, experts, and corporate actors (Duffield 2001). 
Another point of contention concerns the limitations of an individualist, rationalist per-
spective, in which most of the literature on brokerage is rooted (Lewis and Mosse 2005).
In order to offer a comprehensive understanding of brokerage that avoids historical 
pathologization and goes beyond overly rationalist perspectives, this chapter pursues a 
broader, integrative agenda. We bring studies on brokerage, intermediation, and trans-
lation together, thereby offering a synthesis that by combining the strengths of these 
approaches on the topic, will help to understand and explain the role of brokerage as a 
mode of governance.
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We review existing approaches to brokerage, intermediation, and translation— 
including the identification of key findings, areas of innovation, and gaps for future 
research— which to date remain dispersed across issue areas and disciplinary debates, 
to offer a conceptualization of brokerage in governance that connects them. This opens 
new opportunities for debate across research fields to understand and explain how bro-
kers are embedded in, and brokerage is a part of, institutionalized modes of social coor-
dination aimed at producing collectively binding rules and collective goods.
We proceed as follows. In a first step, we discuss key approaches to the topic. We then 
suggest a conceptualization of brokers and brokerage for the analysis of governance 
in ALS. In a third step, we discuss and map brokers and forms of brokerage along two 
categories that are particularly relevant for understanding brokerage as a mode of gov-
ernance in ALS: brokerage of state governance and brokerage in and of transnational 
governance. A  final section discusses brokerage and the quality of governance out-
comes, before we conclude and sketch lines for future research.
Main Approaches to Brokerage
The Merriam- Webster Dictionary defines brokers as ‘one who acts as an intermediary’. 
A commonsense understanding of brokerage, thus, suggests that the activity of bro-
kers, brokerage, is synonymous with (inter)mediation, understood as ‘the act of coming 
between’. Brokers and brokerage are thus universal actors and activities as human inter-
action creates seemingly endless opportunities for (inter)mediation, such as, the media-
tion of conflicting interests, the establishment of private, political or economic contacts 
between actors previously unknown to each other, or the translation of various expert 
knowledge to inform practices of governance.
Brokers and brokerage have been analysed in different ways. Political scientists 
tend to follow an actor- centred, mostly rationalist, approach by assuming that 
each actor involved explicitly weighs the costs and benefits of entering relations of 
brokerage, which are ultimately seen as interested and rational ‘transactions’ (e.g. 
Warner 2008: 143). From this perspective, scholars have studied brokers particularly 
within the fields of party politics and elections (e.g. Larreguy et al. 2016; Stokes et al. 
2013) as well as in often- related debates on clientelism, machine politics and patron-
age (e.g. Arias 2006; Calvo and Murillo 2004; Hilgers 2012; Müller 2013; Sidel 1999; 
Scott 1972; Szwarcberg 2012). While this literature often mentions brokers, the term 
remains rather undefined. Studies tend to treat brokers, patrons and intermediar-
ies as interchangeable terms (e.g. Scott 1972: 95; Stokes 1995: 57; Szwarcberg 2012). 
Additionally, due to its focus on specific issue areas, this literature lacks a compre-
hensive understanding of the different roles brokers can play beyond specific policy 
fields (Zarazaga 2014). Finally, the analytical focus tends to neglect transnational 
actors and processes.
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRSTPROOFS, Mon Nov 06 2017, NEWGEN
05_oxfordhb-9780198797203_Part5.indd   334 11/6/2017   8:28:47 PM
Brokerage, Intermediation, Translation   335
 
Anthropological studies have devoted much work to grasp brokers and broker-
age in conceptual and empirical terms (see also Chapters 4 Brendel/ Randeria and 12 
Förster/ Koechlin, this volume). Classic contributions, such as by Eric Wolf (1956: 97), 
conceptualize brokers as actors who ‘stand guard over the critical junctures and syn-
apses of relationships which connect the local system to the larger whole’, with the lat-
ter referring to the national level of politics. The interactionist Manchester School of 
the 1960s and 1970s, while also focusing on particular individuals, was nonetheless able 
to capture much more of the complexity and ambiguity of situations, and contexts of 
brokerage that tie individuals together. In this context, studies of African chiefs engag-
ing with national- level politics emerged, but also studies of traditional healers and how 
they translated Western medicine. Inspired by semiotics and stressing the symbolic 
dimension of brokerage, Clifford Geertz thus introduced the concept of ‘cultural bro-
ker’ (1960). The kijaji, a Javanese Muslime leader he describes, is a prominent example 
of this widespread phenomenon. His local legitimacy, Geertz argued, was based on his 
experience and relations with the broader Islamic World and Mecca, yet with the rise of 
the Indonesian state, the kijaji became part of new sets of translocal relations that turned 
him from a curer and mystic teacher into an (amateur) politician (Geertz 1960: 247). 
This work brought out more clearly the complexities of the process of nation- building in 
‘the new countries of Asia and Africa’ (Geertz: 249). Early anthropological work on bro-
kers, thus, in the spirit of modernization theory, was concerned with nation- building 
in the context of decolonialization, where the broker was considered ‘as a necessary 
but temporary actor that would disappear with the rise of new rational organizational 
forms’ (Lindquist 2015: 871).
Following the decline of modernization theory from the late 1970s onwards, bro-
kerage disappeared as a key focus of anthropology. More recently, however, the broker 
re- appeared in studies of development, revolving around both, an actor- oriented, inter-
actionalist, and a relational approach. The actor- oriented approach has been inspired by 
the emergence of a growing number of intermediaries in development (James 2011; Long 
and Long 1992; Olivier de Sardan 2005). It set out to understand the crucial role of local 
partners, fixers, and translators that an increasing number of international NGOs, bilat-
eral donors, and foundations work with to implement aid projects (see also Chapters 11 
Beisheim et al., and 21 Berger/ Lake, this volume). The strength of this approach is its 
attention to transnational processes that shape the political economy of development 
and the strategic position it affords to intermediaries. However, some of this literature 
has been criticized for assuming relatively stable actor constellations and a fixed set of 
development policy and practice over which actors negotiate, and mediate between. 
Deborah James (2011) is an exception in that she argues that brokers are key in constitut-
ing the very ‘communities in need’ that (in her case, South African housing) policy aims 
at, thus creating the conditions for their own necessity. The actor- oriented approach 
shows ‘brokers operating at the “interfaces” of different world- views and knowledge sys-
tems’ (Lewis and Mosse 2006: 10) as they negotiate roles, relationships, and representa-
tions. The main limitation of this perspective is the key metaphor of ‘interfaces’. This 
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is wrongly suggesting clear- cut systems instead of the much more messy and complex 
strategies, exchange, and translation processes that constitute transnational governance 
(Lewis and Mosse 2006). Focusing on individual actors and strategies risks overlooking 
broader power relations, as well as more- than- human actants of mediation and transla-
tion in governance in ALS.
Instead of delimiting analysis to how actors strategize within seemingly given 
arrangements and categories, others have called for investigating into how govern-
ance projects ‘become real through the work of generating and translating interests, 
creating context by tying in supporters and so sustaining interpretations’ (Lewis and 
Mosse 2006:  13). The uniformity of transnational governance models— from dem-
ocracy promotion, to state- building, to economic development— is surprising given 
their global travels. How do we make sense of such coherence across divergent con-
texts, heterogeneous practices, and contestation? Development cooperation is char-
acterized by metric and epistemic distance, which makes brokers and translation an 
inevitable part of communication between the policy- emanating centre and sites of 
policy implementation (Mitchell 2002; Rottenburg 2009). An ‘epistemic link’ has to 
be established that defines common objectives and practices that donors and recipi-
ents refer to. International development cooperation has manifold examples of this, 
such as the introduction of wealth- distribution models for extractive industries. In 
oil- producing Chad, such a model was spearheaded by the World Bank and involved 
international and local NGOs. Hoinathy and Behrends (2014) demonstrate that while 
the technical components of the model (new legislation, building the rule of law) 
travelled from Washington to N’Djamena, its significations and political rationalities 
did not. Instead of simply declaring the failure of the project, Hoinathy and Behrends 
show how the model got translated and put to use in new, unplanned, ways (see also 
Weszkalnys 2011). Thus, instead of viewing brokers as strategic, utility- maximizing 
actors that ‘bridge’ between fixed social groups (Lindquist 2015:  6), a relational 
approach stresses the very creation and mediation of meaning and belonging through 
brokerage.
This line of research brings into view a crucial and largely overlooked issue with 
governance in ALS:  the ‘complex and friction- laden relationship between thought 
and action in global governance’ (Best 2014: 32). The starting point, here, is no longer 
the issue of policy diffusion and questions of success or failure, but rather how norms, 
policies and practices are co- created and constantly transformed while they travel 
(see also Chapter 21 Berger/ Lake, this volume). This contribution notwithstanding, 
the approach has also been criticized. For one it was for a certain ‘blindness for struc-
tural questions of power and authority’ since their focus is on detailed modes of action 
rather than systemic imbalances (Dölemeyer and Rodatz 2010:  216). Additionally, 
while broadening our understanding of brokerage as a transnational process, there is 
still a tendency to focus on the ‘receiving end’ of transnational governance. The role 
of brokerage in shaping the very global policies directed at ALS, and the international 
organizations (IOs) and institutions that produce them, merits more attention. We will 
turn to this next.
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRSTPROOFS, Mon Nov 06 2017, NEWGEN
05_oxfordhb-9780198797203_Part5.indd   336 11/6/2017   8:28:47 PM
Brokerage, Intermediation, Translation   337
 
Brokers and Brokerage in ALS:  
A Conceptualization
This section outlines our conceptualization of brokers and brokerage that we use for the 
analysis of brokerage as a mode of governance in ALS, and process that shapes such gov-
ernance. By so doing, we draw on Risse’s chapter on modes of governance (Chapter 16, 
this volume). Yet, by its nature, brokerage also questions analytical distinctions intro-
duced there, as it does not constitute an either hierarchical or non- hierarchical mode of 
governance.
As just stated, mediating practices and actors that bring people together are central 
aspects, even foundational, for most social relations. Katherine Stovel, Benjamin Golub, 
and Eva Meyersson Milgrom (2011) offer a useful starting definition of brokers as actors 
who provide for ‘intermediary links in systems of social, economic, or political relations 
who facilitate trade or transmission of valued resources that would otherwise be sub-
stantially more difficult. The crucial characteristics of brokers are that they (i) bridge 
gaps in social structure and (ii) help goods, information, opportunities, or knowledge 
to flow across those gaps’ (Stovel et al. 2011: 21326). These bridging activities, obviously, 
can also be observed in the area of governance as an institutionalized mode of social 
coordination. Brokers, thus, are actors whose bridging and mediating activities influ-
ence the enforcement of collectively binding decisions, how collective goods are deliv-
ered, and for whom. From this follows that the power of brokers depends upon their 
capacity to identify and access resources— from goods, to contacts, knowledge and/ or 
information— that are desired by one actor or set of actors, and that another actor can 
provide. ‘The broker gains power from the fact that without her cooperation neither 
group will get what it wants or needs’: a fact that converts brokers into gatekeepers often 
able to demand bribes or political support in return for their bridging activities (Stovel 
and Shaw 2012: 149).
Brokers are situated at particular ‘interfaces’ (Lewis and Mosse 2006: 10). From an 
understanding of brokers as actors with a rational interest in maintaining or enhancing 
their power follows that the universe of different functions brokers can perform, is lim-
ited. It comprises five different types of brokers and related forms of brokerage (Gould 
and Fernandez 1989: 91– 94). The first type of broker is the gatekeeper who selectively 
grants access to her resources and contacts to an outsider. In addition to the gatekeeper, 
brokers can be representatives in the sense that they are delegates of a subgroup with the 
group’s ‘mandate’ to negotiate contacts with outsiders in the group’s interest. A third type 
of broker is the in- group mediator, or coordinator. This broker mediates only within the 
group to which she belongs without establishing outside contacts. Liaison brokers and 
itinerant brokers are the remaining types of brokers. The former type is an actor who 
connects other actors without having any prior linkages to the parties who she puts in 
contact with each other. The latter is a type of broker who is an outsider, while the par-
ties connected through her act of brokerage belong to the same group. This approach 
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRSTPROOFS, Mon Nov 06 2017, NEWGEN
05_oxfordhb-9780198797203_Part5.indd   337 11/6/2017   8:28:47 PM
338   Hönke/Müller
 
has been criticized for neglecting the importance of bias and cohesion for understand-
ing brokerage, and the related question of inclusiveness/ exclusiveness of the goods 
and resources that are provided by the broker (Stovel et al. 2011), a point we will return 
to next.
If we move on from brokers to brokerage, three analytically different, yet empirically 
often interconnected, practices can be distinguished. We argue with Wenger (1998) 
that brokerage ‘involves processes of translation, coordination, and alignment between 
perspectives. . . . It also requires the ability to link practices by facilitating transactions 
between them’ (Wenger 1998: 109, emphasis added).
Translation occurs in hierarchical and non- hierarchical modes of governance (see 
Chapters 15 Lake, and 16 Risse, this volume). It can be understood as the ‘mutual enroll-
ment and interlocking of interests that produces  . . .  realities’ (Mosse and Lewis 2006: 11). 
In other words, translation not simply refers to brokers’ transmission of resources, such 
as goods or knowledge between ‘bridged’ actors. The bridging itself produces realities. 
Brokers are both filters and relais, through which things flow between the connected 
parties. The broker herself thereby produces relations and realities that are irreducible 
to the interests of the bridged parts. Development policies for example ‘have to be trans-
lated into the different logic of the intentions, goals, and ambitions of the many people 
and institutions they bring together’ (Mosse 2005: 232). That what flows between actors 
is itself modified through the act of translation, including the activity of the broker, but 
also the work of technologies of governance such as specific computer programs, report 
guidelines, or scripts of how to organize interactions. For instance, governance by exter-
nal actors relies on the translation of blueprints, technologies, competent standard prac-
tices, that in the transfer process are (re)interpreted, carried and picked up by diverse 
mediators (Behrends et al. 2014: 2– 4; Stepputat and Larsen 2015) while also carrying 
their own logic of ordering the world (for governance by external actors, see Chapters 10 
Lederer, 11 Beisheim et al., and 13 Börzel/ Deitelhoff, this volume). Translation involves 
(a) defining a model; (b) testing, stabilizing, and specifying the roles of this model; and 
(c) rendering it mobile (Callon 1986). Once a governance model travels, it does retain 
something of its original definition but also changes. Translation thus is about how the 
practices of knowing and ordering the world (and thus of governance) are inseparably 
intertwined and mediated, not only by human brokers but also by objects and technolo-
gies (Jasanoff 2004).
Brokerage also involves coordination. Coordination can be achieved through hier-
archical mechanisms, such as a broker’s use/ threat of coercion or compliance related 
to their legitimate authority and institutional embeddedness. But coordination can 
also be achieved through non- hierarchical mechanisms, such as negotiation or the 
mobilization of trust- based relationships (see Chapters 16 Risse and 18 Draude et al., 
this volume). This is not a disinterested practice. Brokers tend to coordinate the flow 
of relevant goods. As Zarazaga (2014) has illustrated with regards to the role of brokers 
in the Argentinian social income working programme (Argentina Trabaja: Programa 
de Ingreso Social con Trabajo), which includes cooperatives that organize community 
work, such as street cleaning, brokers run these cooperatives and, as coordinators, they 
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‘usually decide which work has priority and how it is going to be completed’ (Zarazaga 
2014: 29). Through this coordination work, brokers enhance their own power in three 
important ways:
First, they build a reputation for having access to resources and delivering them. They 
fill the gap between state provisions and people’s needs by getting services and small- 
scale public goods for their neighborhoods. By providing everything from pavement 
materials to sewage pipes, brokers develop a reputation for accessing resources and 
delivering to poor people. (Zarazaga 2014)
From this follows that coordination is a strategic effort by brokers that aims at coordi-
nating activities and actors in a way that the ability of the broker to perform as a coordi-
nator enhances her power and standing vis- à- vis all parties involved.
Alignment, the third practice that brokerage entails, comes analytically close to what is 
often referred to as mediation, namely the bridging of, often conflicting, interests through 
which the actors connected in and through brokerage are brought ‘in line’. Alignment, in 
this regard, ‘requires the ability to coordinate perspectives and actions in order to direct 
energies to a common purpose’ (Wenger 1998: 187). It can therefore be seen as an analyt-
ically separate, yet empirically integrated, aspect of the coordination. And, as the latter, 
it can be achieved through hierarchical or non- hierarchical mechanisms. Hierarchical 
mechanisms can be based on alignment with a dominant party or social group. In add-
ition to providing institutionalized systems regarding the ‘common purpose’, alignments 
also offer access to political power and other material or political benefits. An example of 
this are Zambian ethnic leaders ‘who maintain consistent ties to a single political party 
and extract goods to further social interests’ (Holland and Palmer- Rubin 2015:  1203). 
Non- hierarchical mechanisms would involve the mobilization of trust- based relation-
ships such as when representative brokers, for instance those involved in a social move-
ment, in and through their actions produce feelings of trust that facilitate the alignment 
of personal and collective identities and interests: the ‘common purpose’ mentioned here 
(Hunt and Benford: 2004: 445; see also Chapter 18 Draude et al., this volume).
The Brokerage of State Governance
One key concern, that in the 1950s and 1960s led to the ‘discovery’ of brokers, were the 
processes of nation- building and state formation in ‘new states’ undergoing decolon-
ization (see previous section, ‘Brokers and Brokerage in ALS: A Conceptualization’). 
These processes produced ‘gaps’, including those ‘between the cosmopolitan or national 
and the local, between the modern and the traditional, between the rulers and ruled’ 
(Shils 1962: 30). It was this awareness of ‘gaps’ that brought attention to brokers as actors 
capable of ‘bridging’ the former through ‘the linking of the “little community” with the 
larger socio- economic system in which it exists’ (Powell 1970: 413).
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Leaving the modernization theory overtones of these debates aside, what decoloniza-
tion demonstrated was that in most ‘new states’, the ‘reach of the state’ (Shue 1990) was 
structurally limited. Most of these states were and continue to be ALS. While this is not 
an exclusive feature of ‘new’ post- colonial states, but also holds true for Southern Europe, 
notably in Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Greece (e.g. Blakeley 2001; Silva 1994; Hopkin and 
Mastropaolo 2001), as well as parts of the United States (O’Donnell 1993: 1359; see also 
Cornwell 1964; Scott 1972: 117; Shefter 1994), it is important to recognize that in the case 
of the post- colony one central aspect that contributed to the structural emergence of 
brokers was the lasting impact of colonialism and related patterns of state formation 
(see Chapters 3 Schlichte and 4 Brandel/ Randeria, this volume). The latter were marked 
by internal centre- periphery dynamics in which political power, as colonial state power, 
radiated ‘outward from the core political areas’ and diminished in the peripheries 
(Herbst 2000: 252). As a consequence of this, colonial rule was selective. From this fol-
lowed the ‘outsourcing’ of political authority, to private companies and to local ‘big men’, 
such as caciques in Latin America, zamidar landlords in India, or ‘traditional’ chiefs 
in Africa (but see Chapters 3 Schlichte and 12 Förster/ Koechlin, this volume). These 
actors became brokers, capable of bridging gaps between the colonial bureaucracies 
and local populations, and on who colonial administrations depended to get access to 
local populations, territories and resources (Hönke and Müller 2012: 389). In turn, this 
contributed to the ‘rule of intermediaries’ (Schlichte 2005) throughout (post)colonial 
societies, including the negotiated character of political power (Hagmann and Péclard 
2010; Müller 2012; Stepputat 2007), the presence of multiple forms of ‘private indi-
rect government’ (Mbembe 2001: 67– 101), as well as the related dispersion of violence 
and fragmentation of sovereignty (Comaroff and Comaroff 2006; Davis 2010). These 
processes created a political opportunity structure for the emergence of brokers who, 
through their linguistic capabilities and local embeddedness, were also frequently able 
to influence and transform the information, knowledge, and actions of colonial pow-
ers, as well as to appropriate the symbols of the latter for their own purposes, thereby 
mediating colonial power and brokering— in the sense of translation, coordination, and 
alignment— between local elites, populations, and colonial officials (Osborn 2003).
Under such conditions, the reach of state governance ‘from the centre’ in ALS depends 
upon the incorporation of brokers in the ‘peripheries’. Brokerage, in turn, becomes a 
mode of governance that, from the perspective of state elites, enhances the reach of the 
state and state governance by incorporating brokers as ‘bridgers’ and ‘translators’, with 
all the trade- offs this implies. State actors interested in expanding the reach of state gov-
ernance depend on the bridging capacities of brokers who channel resources to them-
selves and their constituencies. However, state actors are not just passively dependent 
on brokers’ willingness and ability to ‘bridge’. They pursue different strategies that shape 
brokered forms of state governance.
One strategy can be termed ‘politics of appropriation’ (Müller 2012). It consists of the 
tolerated appropriation of state resources by brokers for private (coercive, political and 
economic) purposes. By appropriating the state under informally negotiated rules of the 
game, brokers guarantee a mediated form of state governance that is appealing to state 
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elites whose ability to enforce binding decision throughout their territory is constrained 
(Müller 2012: 30). Stated otherwise, this mode of brokered state governance is based on 
efforts to incorporate brokers as ‘proxies’ into political and economic projects pursued 
by state elites and bureaucrats in order to enhance the reach of the state in the absence of 
functioning state institutions.
Another strategy consists of the selective engagement with certain brokers, as well 
as their privileged incorporation through ‘power- sharing arrangements’ (Boone 2003). 
Through these efforts, state elites not only foster competition between brokers, but they 
also make institutional choices that aim at binding ‘loyal’ brokers to particular state 
resources, thereby enhancing the broker’s dependency on access to particular institu-
tions while simultaneously weakening the broker’s negotiation power via- á- vis the state. 
If successful, brokers loose some of their autonomy and become clients of the state. 
A third strategy that state actors resort to in order to undermine the power of brokers is 
the intentional bypassing of resources/ the channelling of resources to competing bro-
kers, including the intentional de- institutionalization of state structures that are tied to 
particular brokers (Reno 1998).
From the broker’s point of view, the response to such state efforts, particularly those 
aimed at undermining the broker’s power are met with resistance. As brokers depend 
upon their exclusive gate- keeping function, they often resort to violence or intimidation 
to maintain their status as the only gate in town, as for instance Friedrich’s classic account 
of Mexican town ‘bosses’ or caciques, demonstrates (Friedrich 1986; see also Chapter 14 
Berti, this volume). However, brokers are not only confronted with top- down pressures 
but also by bottom- up demands. In contexts in which ‘monopolistic’ brokers are literally 
the only actors capable of bridging ‘local’ and ‘state’ actors, they enjoy relatively high lev-
els of autonomy and power. It is in such contexts where the politics of appropriation as a 
mode of brokered state governance dominate, with the implications that the incentives 
of the broker to distribute resources derived through brokerage beyond the ‘inner cir-
cle’ of followers are limited (on ‘inner- ’ and ‘outer- circle’, see Auyero 1999). However, in 
other constellations, where brokers are faced with a different and more plural/ competi-
tive environment, they have to demonstrate to their constituencies that the latter gain 
more from the alignment with a particular broker. This can improve the inclusiveness 
of collective goods. Where ALS witness a democratization and pluralization of political 
actors, those at the receiving end of broker- state relations can and do switch alignments 
in order to get the ‘most’ out of their participation in brokerage. And it is this possibility 
of switching between different brokers that enhances the power of brokers’ constitu-
ency. Pressure mounts to perform as an effective problem- solver and goods- provider for 
her group (Hilgers 2009; also see next paragraph).
One consequence of the dependence of brokerage on access to state resources, as well 
as the mediated distribution of derived goods, is that brokerage contributes positively 
to the symbolic dimension of state governance in ALS. By extending the reach of the 
otherwise absent state, brokers produce ‘state effects’ (Mitchell 1991) by producing state- 
related expectations, hopes, and ideas— often via the broker’s translation of state ideas 
into local meaning systems (Nuijten 2003). They thus reproduce a mediated shadow of 
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state legitimacy even in the absence of functioning state institutions (Müller 2012). This, 
in turn, provides ‘possibilities for political action and activism’ (Gupta 1995: 394) that 
are centred on the state and state- related entitlements, such as practices of citizenship 
(Hilgers 2009). The latter cannot be reduced to interested transactions, but demon-
strates that translation processes have the potential to escape the control of actors inter-
ested in maximizing their power. In other words, far from simply undermining the state, 
brokered state governance, in fact, positively contributes to the symbolic reproduction 
of the state in ALS (see Chapter 3 Schlichte, this volume).
Brokerage and Intermediation 
in Transnational Governance
Brokerage, mediation, and translation are ubiquitous in transnational governance, too. 
Research on this remains dispersed and little systematic though. The following pulls 
insights from several studies together to identify key insights, as well as future research 
frontiers in this emerging field of research.
Recall that from the 1980s onwards, governance through brokerage has become the 
norm rather than an exception in global governance (Avant et al. 2010; Neumann and 
Sending 2010; Rosenau and Czempiel 1992; Schlichte 2005). While it is beyond the 
scope of this chapter to discuss the historical precedents of this, histories of empire and 
colonialism are full of evidence of brokerage (e.g. Newbury 2000; Schaffer et al. 2009; 
Chapter 7 Esders et al., this volume), as are accounts of Cold War patron- client struc-
tures between superpowers and former colonizing states, on the one hand, and gov-
ernments in the Global South, on the other (Clapham 1996; Gasiorowski 1991). Yet, in 
the following, we will focus on the growing role of brokerage and intermediation in 
response to the ‘neoclassical revolution’ in development from the 1980s, and in particu-
lar the era of post- Cold War liberal global governance. External governance of ALS has 
come to follow a new logic that includes ‘non- state actors in shaping and carrying out 
global governance functions  . . .  by which civil society is redefined from a passive object 
of government to be acted on into an entity that is both an object and a subject of gov-
ernment’ (Neumann and Sending 2010: 16– 17; see also Chapter 11 Beisheim et al., this 
volume).
Similar to brokerage of state governance, brokers in international aid, transnational 
security, or health governance seek to monopolize access to external donors, and chan-
nel resource flows in specific ways in return for rents and/ or political legitimation (Lewis 
and Mosse 2006; Olivier de Sardan 2005). Competing brokers, such as different national 
political and/ or bureaucratic elites, use their access to external actors in this regard. In 
some cases they even ‘invite’ them to intervene (Müller 2015) in order ‘to discipline some 
strongmen in a domestic hierarchy of authority and exclude some groups altogether’ 
(Reno 1997: 166). Along similar lines, the post- 9/ 11 global counterterrorism agenda has 
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been used by domestic elites to enhance the capacity of security institutions and crack 
down on domestic opponents and minorities (Bachmann and Hönke 2010).
External actors, in turn, rely on intermediaries for various reasons. International 
relations are still based on the norm of sovereignty, even though it has become more 
porous. This norm needs to work through governments. Notwithstanding the deeply 
engrained, unequal power relations in ‘paternalism across borders’ (Barnett 2017), par-
ticipatory approaches to aid require local partners. More recently, international rela-
tions scholars have also started to look at intermediation in complex arrangements of 
global governance more generally (thus no explicit attention to ALS). Focused on multi-
layered institutional arrangements, this research argues that IOs would govern through 
intermediaries more in soft policy issue areas, where governments accept to exercise less 
control (Abbott et al. 2014), such as human rights (Pegram 2015: 601; Chapter 21 Berger/ 
Lake, this volume). However, as shown earlier, in the traditionally most state- centric 
area of security, governance via intermediaries and brokers has also grown. Concepts 
of counterinsurgency and resilience (Pospisil and Kühn 2016), as well as the commer-
cialization of security provision, turned security governance in ALS more indirect and 
increased external actors’ dependence on third- party information and service pro-
viders, and local partners (see Chapter 19 Schröder, this volume). Even multinational 
companies that are not specialized in the provision of security have become enrolled in 
global security governance in the context of the ‘business for peace’ agenda (Berdal and 
Mousavizadeh 2010; Haufler 2010; Hönke 2014).
The results of this situation are mixed and often deeply contradictory. While for some 
observers, intermediaries are seen as enhancing the effectiveness of implementing 
global governance, it has also been shown that states can avoid accountability by out-
sourcing security governance in ALS to intermediaries (Avant and Nevers 2011; Jones 
and Newburn 1998). Additionally, working through intermediaries and local strong-
men has been used by external actors as a means to stabilize fragile contexts, in particu-
lar in the aftermath of 9/ 11, when state fragility became perceived as a potential threat 
to ‘homeland security’ (Bachmann 2008; Fisher 2014; MacGinty 2012). Research on 
multinational companies (MNCs) has shown, for instance, how in order to create stable 
working conditions, MNCs use brokerage by working with private security companies 
and through clientelistic arrangements with local political elites in the context of cor-
porate social responsibility (Hönke 2013, forthcoming; Reno 2004; see also Chapter 13 
Börzel/ Deitelhoff, this volume).
The best studied area of brokerage as a mode of transnational governance in ALS is the 
area of international development. Since the 1980s, governance through NGOs became 
a widespread donor strategy to circumvent states (Duffield 2001; Neumann and Sending 
2010). IOs often work through intermediaries (NGOs, national agencies they create) to 
govern (Abbott et al. 2014). In this context, the anthropology of international develop-
ment (e.g. Olivier de Sardan 2005) focuses on social actors who ‘specialize in the acquisi-
tion, control, and redistribution of development “revenue” ’ (Mosse and Lewis 2006: 12). 
Most often, the focus is on entrepreneurial individuals seeking to exploit a situation in 
their favour, for instance when IO programmes meet rural peasant communities, with a 
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broker intermediating between these two building on her ‘competencies, strategies, and 
“careers” ’ (Lewis and Mosse 2006: 13).
Relational approaches go beyond this perspective by focusing on transnational pro-
fessionals that do— and thus mediate and translate— transnational governance. These 
are for example diplomats, security experts, and professionals, development workers, 
and peacekeepers. Mid- and low- level practitioners and their routine practices, so the 
argument, have a constitutive effect on global governance (e.g. Adler and Pouliot 2011; 
Leander 2005; Neumann 2012). This is indeed similar to the historical role that mer-
chants or translators played in defining ideas of seemingly separate (pre)colonial worlds 
and the boundaries between them (Rothman 2012; Schaffer et al. 2009). In addition, 
contemporary private and military security companies broker a more military under-
standing of security, and, having been turned into legitimate service providers for 
states, translate market- driven views into the field of security expertise (Leander 2005). 
Innovative research on intermediation and expert politics could be fruitfully linked fur-
ther to research on brokerage in global governance.
Recently, insights from science and technology studies have been used to reveal the 
translation done by algorithms, statistics, and audits in the transnational governance 
of ALS. Jacqueline Best (2014: 28), for instance, has put forward a meso- level analysis of 
how the International Monetary Fund (IMF) governs in ALS through such intermediate 
actors and actants, focusing on how standards, indicators, and other mediating technol-
ogies negotiate, translate, and produce governance knowledge into specific practices.
There is a tendency in this body of work to zoom in on what happens when global 
models get implemented in ALS. However, it is also important to stress brokerage in 
the making of the very policies to be implemented in ALS. Brokers relate abstract mod-
els and technologies, which IOs aim to diffuse, to the intentions and rationalities of the 
issuing organization, and to the situation into which it will be inserted. The resulting 
interactions between policymakers, consultants, aid workers, and addressees of pro-
jects, thus allow for creativity, transformation, and the emergence of new practices 
(Rottenburg 2009). Translation thus goes into both directions and is transformative 
(Lewis and Mosse 2006; Merry 2006; Ostermeier 2016; Rottenburg 2009). Such a per-
spective thus captures the crucial role of the Global South in co- constituting global gov-
ernance models and practices, and in transforming ‘the metropole’ (Cooper and Stoler 
1997; Hönke and Müller 2016).
Finally, it is necessary to pay attention to brokerage in global policymaking towards 
ALS. As brokerage involves ‘the identification and localization of knowledge, the redis-
tribution and dissemination of knowledge, and the rescaling and transformation of that 
knowledge’ (Meyer 2010: 210, own emphasis), knowledge brokers are crucial for under-
standing how ALS come to be known as such, and how they should be governed. The 
literature on knowledge brokers has shown how scientific and other expert knowledge 
is mediated and translated during policy formulation. A pertinent example is the car-
eer, despite all scientific critique and contestation, of the term ‘failed states’ and related 
indices (Bachmann and Hönke 2010; Bilgin and Morton 2002). Others show how crises 
in ALS get translated so as to stabilize a coherent version of the truth on which derived 
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security policies are built (e.g. Villumsen- Berling 2017), and how broader politics of 
expertise inform policies towards ALS (Bliesemann de Guevara 2014; Berling and Büger 
2015; Müller and Hochmüller 2017). Last, but not least, it has been shown how myths 
and urban legends crucially shape stereotypical perceptions of ALS, leading to negative 
interventions and outcomes (Bliesemann de Guevara and Kühn 2015).
The Quality of Governance 
by Brokerage and Intermediation
As modes of governance in ALS in general (see Chapter 16 Risse, this volume), broker-
age, intermediation, and translation are widespread and diverse phenomena that defy 
any generic assessment regarding their outcomes. Recent literature suggests that this 
relationship is much more complex than assumed by past scholarship, in both positive 
and negative ways (e.g. Auyero 2001; Cammett and McLean 2011; Hilgers 2009; Hönke 
and Thomas 2012; Tsai 2007). There is a particular research gap in this regard concern-
ing brokerage in external governance of ALS. Furthermore, little research is available on 
how processes of translation affect the quality and effectiveness of governance. Against 
this background, it is mostly the literature on local brokers in ALS that is therefore at the 
centre of the following discussion.
Before we turn to this, however, a short clarification of the quality of governance, and 
the difficulties with assessing it is in order. We consider the inclusiveness of govern-
ance to be the most important dimension of quality. Two measures stand out: namely 
the claimed, and the actual scope of collective goods provision. Scope refers to both 
geographical and social reach: which geographical areas, and which social groups are 
addressed, and where and for whom is governance implemented (Hönke and Thomas 
2012). A third dimension is crucial: the perception of governance; that is whether peo-
ple evaluate governance outcomes as broad and fair, or narrow, unequal and exclu-
sionary (Cammett and MacLean 2011: 9, Hönke and Thomas 2012; see also Chapter 6 
Stollenwerk, this volume). For the same absolute measures of scope, such evaluations 
can vary widely.
Turning to the quality of governance through brokerage, brokers in theory could be 
disinterested and impartial actors. An earlier generation of scholars worked on clientel-
ism and addressed the role of brokers in patron- client relations as a neutral, if not posi-
tive and important functional equivalent to absent or inefficient state institutions, as well 
as an effective mechanism for creating social cohesion. Such functionality is of course 
not always evident. Those who engage in brokerage are often interested in maintaining 
and accumulating power. Being an impartial facilitator rarely allows for that. Thus, bro-
kers often ‘provide selective access to goods and opportunities and place themselves or 
their supporters in positions from which they can divert resources and services in their 
favor’ (Roninger 2004: 354). Stated otherwise, brokers may guard ‘monopolistic’ access 
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to goods and networks, as it is this monopoly on which their power and capacity to act 
as brokers ultimately depends. More recent scholarship, including on (neo)patrimoni-
alism and corruption, is dominated by a more negative perspective of intermediaries. 
In particular, after the 1990s, and following the ‘third wave of democratization’, debates 
shifted towards assessing the negative implications of persisting patron- client struc-
tures on democratization processes. As a consequence, personalized relations of rule 
that work via brokers and intermediaries have been mostly analysed as a problem (for 
democracy, citizenship, the effectiveness of state institutions, the provision of collective 
goods, and so on). This perspective, however, neglects previous insights regarding the 
functional equivalence of governance through intermediaries, and the accountability 
mechanisms operational in patrimonial relations.
A key debate in the more recent literature, therefore, is under which conditions 
governance by local brokers is inclusive or exclusive. Two criteria emerge from the 
literature on brokers at the local level in ALS: bias and cohesion. Bias refers to ‘the 
extent to which the broker is relationally, socially, or informally closer to one party 
than the other, whereas cohesion describes the level of internal solidarity or cohesion 
among sets of actors linked by the broker’ (Stovel and Shaw 2012: 142). If the group to 
which brokers provide access is cohesive and the (representative) broker has strong 
ties, such as ethnical or ideological, to this group, the broker is less likely to act in a 
purely self- interested way as would be the case if the broker is only weakly integrated 
in the group (Stovel and Shaw 2012: 144). In other words, brokers tend to divert a 
lesser amount of resources and goods to themselves, and serve the broader collect-
ive good if they are embedded in inclusive societal institutions of those they repre-
sent (also Hönke and Börzel 2013; Tsai 2007). The less cohesive the group, or rather, 
the less inclusive societal institutions are, the more brokerage tends to be favour the 
broker (i.e. a bureaucrat), over the group. The gatekeeper, in this regard is situated on 
one side of the continuum of brokerage and the representative broker on the other. 
While gatekeepers tend to monopolize the resources that flow through their broker-
age interactions, representative brokers in turn provide more collective good- like 
benefits for their group. In other terms, if the broker is closer to an outsider, like an 
external actor or the state, who wants to get access to the broker’s group, the broker’s 
actions will favour these actors and their interests over those at the receiving end, 
and vice- versa.
Conclusions
This chapter has shown that brokerage, intermediation, and translation are ubiquitous 
characteristics of our times— in and beyond ALS. In offering an integrative and syn-
thesizing reading of the dispersed debates on brokerage as a mode of governance, we 
pointed towards the relevance as well as shortcomings of actor- centred approaches 
and their focus on power- maximizing actors, while stressing the frequently neglected 
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importance of translation approaches, which, in turn, often underestimate the power 
relations involved in brokerage. We also brought the dominant, more micro- centred 
approaches, into a dialogue with literature that points towards the transnational 
dimension of brokerage in ALS. We thereby indicated that, far from being a phenom-
enon exclusively located in ALS, brokerage in ALS also shapes the very global poli-
cies directed at ALS, and the IOs and institutions that produce them. The synthesizing 
reading, suggested by us, can also serve as a basis for empirically assessing the so far 
rather understudied transnational brokerage chains that link ALS to areas of more con-
solidated statehood and the global institutions shaping contemporary world politics, 
thereby contributing to an understanding of how governance in ALS is co- produced 
globally through brokerage, and to what effect.
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